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Abstract
Agricultural large-scale land acquisition (LSLA) is a process that is currently not captured by land change models. We present a
novel land change modeling approach that includes processes governing LSLAs and simulates their interactions with other land
systems. LSLAs differ from other land change processes in two ways: (1) their changes affect hundreds to thousands of contiguous
hectares at a time, far surpassing other land change processes, e.g., smallholder agriculture, and (2) as policy makers value LSLA as
desirable or undesirable, their agency significantly affects LSLA occurrence. To represent these characteristics in a land change
model, we allocate LSLAs as multi-cell patches to represent them at scale while preserving detail in the representation of other
dynamics. Moreover, LSLA land systems are characterized to respond to an explicit political demand for LSLA effects, in addition
to a demand for various agricultural commodities. The model is applied to simulate land change in Laos until 2030, using three
contrasting scenarios: (1) a target to quadruple the area of LSLA, (2) a moratorium for new LSLA, and (3) no target for LSLA.
Scenarios yield drastically different land change trajectories despite having similar demands for agricultural commodities. A high
level of LSLA impedes smallholders’ engagement with rubber or cash crops, while a moratorium on LSLA results in increased
smallholder involvement in cash cropping and rubber production. This model goes beyond existing land change models by
capturing the heterogeneity of scales of land change processes and the competition between different land users instigated by LSLA.
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Introduction
Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) have become a signifi-
cant global land changing force since their proliferation follow-
ing the 2008 food crisis (Deininger et al. 2011; Messerli et al.
2014). These transactions of relatively large tracts of land to
agribusinesses, investment funds, and foreign governmental
players have been welcomed as a long-overdue investment in
the agricultural sector, initiating new value chains, introducing
new agricultural technology, and creating employment (Arezki
et al. 2011). However, others emphasize concerns over human
rights, land rights, and biodiversity losses (De Schutter 2011;
Cotula 2012; Davis et al. 2015). Although data on LSLA is
scarce and not flawless (Oya 2013), the best-available database
reports 1501 known concluded LSLAs, constituting 50 million
hectares of land to be dedicated to food, energy, and industrial
crops (LandMatrix Project: International Land Coalition (ILC)
et al. 2018, consulted 07-02-2018; Anseeuw et al. 2013). An
additional 20 million hectares constitute known intended land
deals, marking the ongoing nature of the phenomenon. LSLA
has globally targeted densely populated, accessible croplands,
Editor:Wolfgang Cramer.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article
(https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1316-8) contains supplementary
material, which is available to authorized users.
* Niels Debonne
n.debonne@vu.nl
Jasper van Vliet
jasper.van.vliet@vu.nl
Andreas Heinimann
Andreas.Heinimann@cde.unibe.ch
Peter Verburg
peter.verburg@vu.nl
1 Department of Environmental Geography, Institute for
Environmental Studies, Faculty of Science, VU University
Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081
HVAmsterdam, The Netherlands
2 Centre for Development and Environment (CDE) and Institute of
Geography, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
3 Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research
(WSL), Birmensdorf, Switzerland
Regional Environmental Change (2018) 18:1857–1869
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1316-8
and to lesser extents also remote forestlands and moderately
populated areas (Messerli et al. 2014). While neither plantation
agriculture nor foreign large-scale agricultural investments are
exceptional in history (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006; Baglioni
and Gibbon 2013), the scale of the recent upsurge is trend-
breaking (Byerlee 2014) and deserves the attention of land
change scientists to study drivers, trends, and impacts of the
phenomenon (Messerli et al. 2013).
The concept of land systems, human-induced transforma-
tions of ecosystems and landscapes, and the resulting changes
in land cover, provides a framework for the representation of
the human-environment interactions on land (Verburg et al.
2013). LSLA systems set themselves apart from more tradi-
tional trajectories such as smallholder intensification and con-
version to urban land, for two reasons. Firstly, the conversion
that an LSLA instigates is orders of magnitude larger than
conversions related to traditional smallholder farming. In this
way, LSLAs break away from the traditional approach to-
wards studying land system dynamics, which typically frames
changes as being small and incremental. However, these
large-scale, abrupt conversions caused by LSLAs occur with-
in the context of, and interact with, continuous small-scale
incremental land system changes (Cramb et al. 2015).
Therefore, in a LSLA context, a multi-scalar approach is nec-
essary for the explanation of current and the projection of
future land system changes. Secondly, LSLAs distinguish
themselves from smallholder systems in that they are often
used as a policy tool to reach development targets, such as
increasing land productivity, developing land identified as
idle, and extending state control over the domestic rural hin-
terland (Borras and Franco 2012; Lavers 2012; Cotula et al.
2014). Therefore, LSLAs are often negotiated as package
deals in which the investor is expected to develop road, water,
or agricultural processing infrastructure, provide employment,
or create technology spillovers (Lu 2015; Schönweger and
Messerli 2015). This way, LSLA can be seen as an attempt
at outsourcing rural development (Peeters 2015). LSLAs pro-
duce commodities that are also produced by smallholders,
making them direct competitors (Byerlee 2014). In a context
of smallholder transitions to cash crops, such as maize, sugar
cane, and rubber (Cramb et al. 2009; Hall 2011; Thanichanon
2015), LSLAs manifest themselves as an alternative pathway
to fulfilling the same land-based demands.
The distinct nature of LSLAs described above constitutes a
challenge to land change models (LCMs). In land system sci-
ence, LCMs are used to study land system change processes,
provide projections to inform policy makers or to perform
scenario analysis (Turner et al. 2007). However, the multi-
scalar approach and the specific political steering of LSLAs
are not adequately represented in current LCMs. Usually, the
choice of resolution in these tools reflects the scale of the
processes being modeled, with pixels being the units at which
conversion decisions are represented (van Delden et al. 2011).
However, LSLAs instigate an interaction of small-scale, pixel
level changes with large-scale changes involving multiple
pixels at the same time. Furthermore, when defining the
drivers of land change, it should be acknowledged that
LSLAs provide more than simply the plantation products—
they also potentially generate a host of effects that policy
makers may either find desirable or undesirable. In recent
history, countries have therefore taken on very different atti-
tudes towards LSLA in their territory, ranging from permis-
sive to restrictive stances, depending on the effects empha-
sized by policy makers (Cotula et al. 2014). Therefore, there
is a need to reevaluate the way drivers are defined and land use
changes are allocated in LCMs.
The objective of this paper is to represent the characteristics
that distinguish LSLA dynamics in a land change modeling
framework and use this model to explore different LSLA de-
velopment trajectories as they interact with smallholder land
use dynamics. To that effect, we build on the CLUMondo land
system model (van Asselen and Verburg 2013). We augment-
ed the CLUMondo model by adding a multi-cell allocation
algorithm, which is able to convert multiple contiguous cells
and thereby mimics the large-scale nature of LSLAs while
preserving detail in the representation of other dynamics
(e.g., smallholder agriculture or urbanization). To translate
possible policies towards LSLAs (from LSLA-restrictive to
LSLA-encouraging), we represent the effects of LSLA per-
ceived by policy makers in a specific demand (driver) in our
model. These perceived effects can be positive or negative
depending on the scenario. To our knowledge, the resulting
model is the first to explicitly simulate LSLA and its interac-
tion with smallholder agriculture. To illustrate how LSLAs
can cause different land change trajectories, we applied it for
the Lao PDR, a country subject to many land acquisitions, as
there is a relative abundance of data on LSLA location and
types available.
Methods
Study area
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (hereafter called Laos)
is a lower-middle-income country in Southeast Asia of 6.8
million inhabitants (2015 situation). With an average GDP
growth of 8% over the last decade, it is one of the fastest
growing economies, and this growth has been driven for a
third by use of water, mineral, and forest resources (World
Bank 2017). Poverty eradication is high on the national agen-
da, but is still a challenge, especially in remote areas (Epprecht
et al. 2008; World Bank 2017). Agriculture constitutes a quar-
ter of the GDP and employs 75% of the population (2010
situation). The sector is dominated by rice-based subsistence
agriculture, both as upland swidden agriculture and as
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permanent paddy rice fields (Schmidt-Vogt et al. 2009; FAO
2017a). However, the agricultural sector is characterized by
rapid commercialization (Heinimann et al. 2013). These
changes manifest themselves in both LSLAs and smallholder
transitions to market-oriented crops.
LSLAs in Laos are usually granted by the government in
the form of land concessions or leases. A nationwide inven-
tory in 2010 identified 1.1 million hectares, or 5% of the
territory of Laos, to be an agricultural land concession or lease
(Schönweger et al. 2012), although not all of these projects are
large-scale (defined in this study as larger than 100 ha). The
granting of concessions and leases started in 2000 and prolif-
erated from 2005 onwards. In a follow-up of this inventory,
Hett et al. (2015) found that between 2010 and 2015, the
number of concessions and leases rose by 71% in the prov-
inces of Luang Prabang and Xiengkhouang, showing that de-
spite moratoria in 2007 (for forestry plantations) and 2012 (for
eucalyptus and rubber plantations), LSLA continued. Only
30% of projects are foreign-owned; these projects constitute
72% of the total acquired area (Schönweger et al. 2012).
LSLAs intend to produce rubber, timber, and cash crops such
as sugar cane, biofuel crops, and coffee.
Amidst the ongoing LSLA dynamics, changes in small-
holder agriculture are drastically reshaping the Lao agricultur-
al landscape. Smallholders are intensifying and integrating
into global markets (Thanichanon 2015; Ornetsmüller et al.
2016), thereby competing in the same markets as LSLAs. The
still extensive swidden landscapes are rapidly transforming to
permanent agriculture. Additionally, smallholders are increas-
ingly engaging in rubber production (Manivong and Cramb
2008; Fox and Castella 2013).
Characterizing novel land systems in Laos in 2010
We start our modeling exercise with a land system map
representing the year 2010, based on a combination of national
land cover maps, census data, and a collection of best-
available data on LSLAs. All input data was first aggregated
or resampled to the same spatial resolution and the same ex-
tent, to ensure consistency. We classify land systems, which
denote typical combinations of land cover, land use, and land
management (van Asselen and Verburg 2012), using a hierar-
chical decision tree (Fig. S1 in Supplementary Information
(SI)) yielding 15 land systems. The characterization of swid-
den is based onOrnetsmüller et al. (2018). Because recent land
use changes in Laos are characterized by both a rapid increase
in large-scale land acquisitions and a smallholder transition to
more diverse and marketable crops, we designed our classifi-
cation to represent both these trajectories. An overview of all
land systems is given in Table 1, and the resulting land system
map is shown in Fig. 1. Given the resolution of available input
data, we opted for a resolution of 2000 m. Details, data
sources, and classification procedures are given in SI-2.
Seven out of the 15 land systems represent LSLAs. For the
remainder of this study, we define LSLA as an acquisition
(transfer of use rights) of land of more than 100 ha, with the
intention to use this land for agriculture or forestry. This def-
inition includes industrial commodities such as rubber, but
excludes acquisitions for mining, tourism, or special econom-
ic zones. While 100 ha is not particularly large in a global
context, we use this threshold for Laos following
Schönweger and Ullenberg (2009) because the average farm
size in Laos is 1.6 ha (USAID 2013). Hence, by comparison,
100 ha can justifiably be considered large-scale. Spatial data
of LSLA was obtained from the Land Observatory (Land
Observatory Project 2017) and the Centre for Development
and Environment (Schönweger et al. 2012; Hett et al. 2015).
We classified LSLAs into seven systems based on their main
produce—rubber, timber (e.g., teak or eucalyptus), arable
crops, and coffee—and size (small and large, threshold arbi-
trarily set at 500 ha). As almost no coffee plantations are larger
than 500 ha, all coffee plantations are included in one class.
Furthermore, we distinguish four smallholder agriculture sys-
tems: (1) swidden (also known as shifting cultivation) is a
rotational system where a short cultivation phase is alternated
with a long fallow phase. The dominant crop in the cultivation
phase is upland rice (Mertz et al. 2009); (2) Mixed cash crop—
subsistence mosaics cultivate a mix of paddy rice for subsis-
tence and other crops for market purposes; (3) In cash crop
focused smallholder systems, farmers specialize towards mar-
ketable crops such as coffee, fruits, or sugar cane; and (4)
rubber smallholder mosaics are systems with a large rubber
component. The land system map is completed with dense
forest, urban, bare land, and water.
We parameterize each land system with six commodities,
services, or effects of land use it can produce in a single cell per
time step (Table 1). A commodity or service can be provided
by multiple land systems, and a land system can potentially
provide multiple commodities, services, and effects at once, or
none (e.g., water) (Fig. 2). The commodities and services are
(1) subsistence crops, which are those crops that are predom-
inantly produced for consumption by the producer and her
family and local community; (2) cash crops, which are all
crops except rubber that are predominantly produced for sale
on regional to global commodity markets; (3) rubber, although
also a cash crop, is represented as a separate commodity given
its importance in Laos; (4) timber, which captures all output
from forestry plantations; (5) urban area, representing all ser-
vices the urban centers provide, including living space and
infrastructure; (6) large-scale land acquisition itself, which is
a way of quantifying the effects LSLAs are perceived to have
by the host government. Whether the effects of LSLA are
perceived by policy makers as positive or negative is
scenario-dependent (see scenarios below). Each plantation sys-
tem therefore produces one unit of BLSLA,^ allowing for the
definition of explicit targets on the amount of LSLAs in
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parameterization (e.g., a target to increase the amount of
LSLAs or to cease granting of LSLAs). The empirical quanti-
fication of land system services is further described in SI-1.
Note that small plantation systems also produce subsistence
crops, because at the scale of a 400-ha cell, these systems are
defined as a mosaic of plantations and smallholders. In con-
trast, large plantation systems are typified as monocultures.
The land system classification and associated commodities
instigate a dichotomy between subsistence agriculture and
cash crop agriculture. For smallholders, this allows the simu-
lation of market integration, while at the same time, the com-
petition between smallholders and LSLAs can be modeled.
We empirically defined the two commodity groups based on
proportions of land dedicated to cash crops, derived from the
Agricultural Census (see SI-2). Commodity production fig-
ures where then calculated using typical yields reported by
(FAO 2017b).
Model description and implementation
To simulate land system changes until 2030, we applied the
CLUMondo model (van Asselen and Verburg 2013).
CLUMondo allocates land system changes in response to an
exogenously defined demand for commodities, services, or
effects in yearly time steps, using an iterative allocation pro-
cedure. In the model, alternative land systems are competing
for space, based on the suitability of locations for each land
system, the current land system configuration, and the com-
petitive advantage of each system to supply the demands. The
characterization of a land system includes stating the com-
modities, services, and effects it can provide (see previous
section), the land systems it can convert into, and the system’s
resistance to conversion. Yearly changes in demand for the
defined land system commodities and services drive land sys-
tem conversion in the model. See SI-1 and van Asselen and
Verburg (2013) for an in-depth explanation of the model.
We empirically determined location suitability following
the assumption that the physical and socio-economic charac-
teristics of the current locations of land systems reflect the
suitability for these systems (e.g., when more rubber is need-
ed, rubber-producing systems will emerge in areas which have
a suitable climate and/or soil for rubber tree growth and that
are accessible to markets) (Van Dessel et al. 2011). The rela-
tions between these location characteristics were identified
using a logistic regression analysis. We selected a set of 28
maps as candidate explanatory variables, covering climate,
soil, terrain, accessibility, ethnicity, and natural hazards.
Candidate explanatory variables were checked for
multicollinearity, and pairs of variables that correlate toomuch
(Pearsons r > 0.8) were not used in the samemodel. Details on
variables and fitted logistic regression models can be found in
SI Table S3–4.
As a consequence of the heterogeneity in scale of land
change processes in a context of LSLA, a multi-scalar ap-
proach is warranted. We made two specific adjustments to
the standard modeling procedures of CLUMondo: multi-cell
allocation and wider-region suitability assessment (Fig. 2).
Firstly, recognizing that the large plantation systems in our
application change on a multi-cellular basis, we developed a
multi-cell allocation algorithm. This algorithm allocates mul-
tiple contiguous cells (patches) of a single land system, with-
out deviating from the competition-based iteration algorithm
Table 1 Overview of land systems and their land system commodity production or services. Calculations and data sources in SI-2
Group Land system Land system commodities and services (production per 400-ha grid cell)
Subsistence crops Cash crops Rubber Timber Urban area LSLA
Large-scale systems Small arable plantation 260 ton 358 ton 1 unit
Small rubber plantation 142 ton 81 ton 1 unit
Small forestry plantation 237 ton 312 m3 1 unit
Large arable plantation 1265 ton 1 unit
Large rubber plantation 286 ton 1 unit
Large forestry plantation 1100 m3 1 unit
Coffee plantation 47 ton 1600 ton 1 unit
Smallholder systems Swidden 296 ton 155 ton
Mixed cash crop—subsistence mosaic 426 ton 604 ton
Cash crop-focused smallholder 83 ton 1173 ton
Rubber smallholder mosaic 142 ton 345 ton 207 ton
Urban system Urban 400 ha
Forest system Dense forest
Static land covers Water
Bare land
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and conversion rules. The algorithm accepts for each land
system the desired patch size (stated as the maximum distance
from a central cell), the minimum suitability each cell has to
have to be included in a patch, and the minimum amount of
cells included in each patch in order to be retained. For exam-
ple, a land system can be parameterized to have patches with
radius equal to 1 cell, a minimum location suitability of 0.5,
and minimum number of cells included equal to 4. In that
case, CLUMondo will find a seed cell at a location with high
suitability for that land system and try to allocate all nine cells
within the radius distance (i.e., a 3 × 3 kernel), but will be
restrained by general conversion rules (e.g., water cannot be
converted) and by the minimum suitability (cells with suitabil-
ity lower than 0.5 for the land system will not be included). If
after applying these rules, the patch has four cells or more, the
patch is allocated. Otherwise, it is discarded and another loca-
tion for a patch of that land system is found.
Second, when allocating large contiguous land systems,
location suitability should reflect the suitability of the wider
area and not simply that of a single pixel in the model. A
single suitable cell surrounded by unsuitable cells is not a
prime location to consider for a large-scale land system.
Therefore, logistic regression models that quantify the suit-
ability for large-scale land systems use versions of the explan-
atory factors that have been smoothed using a moving win-
dow focal analysis (9-cell window). Each factor has a normal
layer, which quantifies a factor (e.g., flood risk) at that cell
location and is used for regressions of small-scale systems,
and a smoothed layer, which quantifies the average of that
factor in the wider area around that cell location and is used
for regressions of large-scale systems.
For our implementation of LSLAs in the model, the param-
eters are provided in Table 2. We set the radii and minimum
amount of cells per patch to correspond to the current average
Fig. 1 Land system map of Laos
in 2010
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size of LSLAs in Laos. The minimum suitability quantifies the
extent to which the multi-cell algorithm can be selective in
creating patches, and when this selectiveness is too high, no
location that meets all criteria will be found. Therefore, we
manually calibrated minimum suitability by adjusting it
downwards until the iterative allocation procedure could find
a solution.
Because a commodity can be produced by different land
systems in different quantities, a change in demand for the
commodity can be resolved by seven land system change
processes that summarize the possible dynamics between
LSLAs and smallholders when these two producer types are
in competition (visualized in Fig. S2, SI). Smallholder
intensification occurs when one smallholder system converts
into another smallholder system that produces more of the
commodity (e.g., from swidden to cash crop-focused small-
holder system for the cash crop commodity). Smallholder
disintensification is the opposite (a smallholder system con-
verts into another smallholder system that produces less of the
commodity in question). LSLA takeover is the conversion of
smallholder systems into LSLA systems, which can result in a
net gain or net loss of commodity production, depending on
Fig. 2 Model framework
Table 2 Multi-cell allocation
parameters for large plantation
systems
Land system Radius (# cells) Minimum suitability Minimum amount of
cells (400 ha) in patch
Large arable plantation 2 0.3 10
Large rubber plantation 1 0.3 6
Large forestry plantation 3 0.1 34
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the smallholder system that is being converted. LSLA
expansion or smallholder expansion occurs when, respective-
ly, LSLA or smallholders put dense forest systems to
commodity-productive use. In our application, we restricted
some trajectories that are hypothetically possible as they are
deemed to be unlikely. Specifically, we restricted the conver-
sion from LSLA to other land systems (i.e., LSLAs do not
disappear), because the high capital investment and long con-
tract times make such conversion unlikely in our time frame.
Scenarios for land system change
We illustrate our model functionality using three contrasting
scenarios of future land system change in Laos. These scenar-
ios are characterized by (1) a high governmental encourage-
ment of LSLA, (2) a moratorium on LSLA, and (3) no specific
LSLA policy. The scenario storylines build on the notion that
policy biases for or against plantation agriculture are a strong
(but not the only) determinant of the occurrence of large-scale
agriculture (Byerlee 2014). The scenarios are highly contrast-
ing and serve to show a wide range of alternative trajectories,
rather than a most likely future. A complete overview of all
parameters and their calculations is given in the SI-4. As
shown in Table 3, we assume that demands for rubber, cash
crops, subsistence crops, and urban area are equal in the three
scenarios. In all scenarios, it is assumed that there is an interest
in LSLA in Laos, i.e., LSLA in Laos is a Bseller’s market^ and
the amount of LSLAs in Laos can be controlled by the
Government of Laos (GoL).
In a first scenario, BHigh LSLA", the GoL aims to include
LSLA in their development strategies by granting land con-
cessions. Policy makers thus perceive or emphasize mostly
positive effects of LSLA and therefore offer attractive condi-
tions for land investors. In the past decade, this strategy was
indeed followed under the denominator of BTurning Land into
Capital^ and was seen as a way to increase rural accessibility
to markets and infrastructure (Schönweger et al. 2012;
Lestrelin et al. 2012). This scenario continues on the land
capitalization track by parameterizing the model to quadruple
the area of LSLAs by 2030 compared to 2010.
The second scenario, named BMoratorium", imposes a
moratorium on new LSLAs starting from 2010. Existing
LSLAs are allowed to continue operation and are not can-
celed. While such a moratorium has not been issued in reality
in 2010, it has in 2007 (for new timber plantations) and in
2012 (for new rubber and eucalyptus plantations) (Hett et al.
2015). Scenario 2 is a stylized, extreme version of these ex-
periences, where the moratorium encompasses all LSLAs and
is assumed to be effective on the ground. Here, we assume
policy makers perceive negative effects of LSLA, which they
want to stop. The demand for LSLA is kept constant at the
2010 level. Timber demand is also kept constant because
smallholders cannot, in our model implementation, substitute
as a producer of this commodity.
The third scenario, BNo LSLA Policy", creates a situation
without restrictions or requirements for the area of new
LSLAs (i.e., this specific land system effect is dropped, in-
creasing the degrees of freedom the model has in allocating
land systems). Policy makers are assumed to be indifferent
and/or ineffectual towards LSLA, and do not intervene in
the competitive dynamics between LSLAs and smallholders.
This scenario highlights the competition between small-
holders and LSLAs, and allocates land systems only based
on their suitability and competitive advantages.
Results
The three scenarios provide land system projections for Laos
in 2030. After a general overview, the results from the three
scenarios are presented in terms of the simulated land system
changes and the processes leading to these changes.
Figure 3 shows the resulting land system maps in 2030
under the three future scenarios. The maps show three quite
different land system patterns, even though the demands for
most land system commodities and services are similar across
all scenarios. Zoomed maps show how plantation systems are
allocated, with small plantation systems allocated in the stan-
dard single-pixel mode. Large plantation systems are allocated
using the multi-cell allocation algorithm, with sizes varying
following Table 2. Figure 4 shows that the extent to which
different land change processes contribute to the fulfillment of
rubber and cash crop demands varies highly. This section
describes detailed results per scenario, in terms of the simulat-
ed land system patterns and the land change processes that
contribute to the fulfillment of the commodity demands.
The High LSLA scenario is parameterized to quadruple the
area of LSLA by 2030. The immediate effect of this policy is
Table 3 Increase in demands of land system services until 2030 as a percentage of demand in 2010
Scenario Timber (%) Cash crops (%) Rubber (%) Subsistence crops (%) Urban areaA (%) LSLA (%)
High LSLA 160 120 200 110 182 400
Moratorium 100 120 200 110 182 100
No LSLA policy 160 120 200 110 182 n.a.
AAverage yearly growth rate of 4.1%, based on calculations of (Ornetsmüller et al. 2016) on UN projections (United Nations 2014)
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proliferation of LSLAs, both by expansion into dense forest
systems and takeovers of smallholder farmland. This is the
only scenario where LSLA takeovers result in a reduction of
cash crop and rubber production (Fig. 4). Smallholder inten-
sification is almost non-existent in this scenario, while some
disintensification takes place. Smallholder expansion is negli-
gible for rubber, but contributes significantly to the additional
cash crop production. However, this entails only conversions
from dense forest to either swidden (2.01 million ha) or mixed
cash crop subsistence mosaics (1.04 million ha) systems, with
expansions into cash crop-focused systems being non-exis-
tent. This means that smallholders are driven to subsistence
agriculture (i.e., swidden and mixed subsistence—cash crop
systems), because LSLAs occupy amajor part of the cash crop
market as well as the land. However, these subsistence-based
land systems also produce some cash crops in our model,
according to the empirical characterization of these systems
(Table 1). Therefore, smallholders still contribute in the pro-
vision of cash crops (Fig. 4). A surprising effect of an LSLA
promotion is thus an increase in swidden extent by 18%.
Fig. 3 Land systems in 2030
under three scenarios. Zoomed
maps visualize how scenarios
differ locally and the ways in
which the multi-cell allocation
algorithm creates distinctively
patched land systems
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TheMoratorium scenario restricts LSLA proliferation, thus
requiring the demands for cash crops and rubber to be met by
smallholders only. Under this scenario, the Chinese border
area undergoes a transformation from swidden and dense for-
est to rubber smallholder mosaics, and Southern Laos loses
dense forest systems to mixed cash crop—subsistence mo-
saics. While smallholder expansion is the dominant process,
this scenario also results in the most pronounced intensifica-
tion by smallholders. Intensification is predominantly attained
by conversions from swidden to other smallholder systems
producing more cash crops and/or rubber, resulting in a net
reduction of swidden extent by 11%.
In the final scenario, where no specific policy related to
LSLA is in place, LSLAs supply only 18% of the increase
in cash crop demand and 46% of the additional demand for
rubber, compared to 48 and 98% for cash crops and rubber
respectively in the High LSLA scenario. This result is sig-
nificant: in the absence of policies, the land system chang-
es are the result of the empirical characterization of land
system suitability in combination with land system specific
parameters. This result shows that neither smallholder nor
LSLA systems are superior in terms of competitiveness in
the model (i.e., the model is not significantly biased to-
wards a specific production method). Instead, the merit of
one system over the other is spatially heterogeneous. Small
rubber and arable plantations are allocated significantly
less in this scenario compared to the High LSLA scenario
(see detail boxes in Fig. 3). This indicates that without an
explicit policy demand for LSLAs, small plantation
systems are only marginally competitive. Under this sce-
nario, swidden extent decreases only by 3%.
Discussion
Interactions between smallholders and agricultural
large-scale land acquisition
Our three scenarios show that, while the demand for rubber
and cash crops can be provided by both smallholders and
LSLAs, the encouragement or discouragement of LSLA re-
sults in very different spatial patterns of land system change.
In our model, the distribution of the production between
smallholders and LSLA depends only on the policies that
govern LSLA. While LSLAs have specific economic (dis-)-
advantages, especially related to processing infrastructure and
labor organization, policy biases for or against LSLA have
historically been decisive in this distribution between LSLA
and smallholder production modes in Southeast Asia (Byerlee
2014). The scenarios laid out here indicate some possible con-
sequences of these policies on land system changes.
Results highlight that while smallholders and LSLAs are
spatially segregated, they are nonetheless strongly linked. The
land change processes LSLAs instigate are therefore shown to
go far beyond the immediate enclosure of large tracts of land.
The notion that LSLAs interact with smallholders has been
identified for individual case studies (e.g., Baird and Fox
2015; Friis et al. 2016). These local studies have provided
Fig. 4 Contribution of different land system change processes to fulfilling the demand for cash crops (a) and rubber (b) in all three scenarios.
Terminology for different land system change processes is given in text. The demand for both commodities is the same in all scenarios
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insights concerning consequences of LSLA on land systems,
livelihoods, or local environments. Our study reveals larger-
scale links between LSLA and smallholder agriculture
through competition in common markets and land resources.
The model projects a decrease of swidden extent in the
Moratorium scenario and an increase in the High LSLA scenar-
io. Decreasing swidden extent has been a policy goal in Laos for
decades (Lestrelin et al. 2013). These results highlight that swid-
den extent may reduce mainly through smallholder intensifica-
tion processes, where smallholders increase production for com-
modity markets by transformation from swidden agriculture to
permanent cropping, but also retain some level of production for
subsistence needs. However, everything else being equal,
LSLAs are projected to impede smallholder intensification and
market integration, and lead to a continuation of subsistence
farming, and specifically swidden farming by smallholders.
Other authors have identified increased accessibility and market
integration as major drivers of swidden transformations (Cramb
et al. 2009; van Vliet et al. 2012). However, there are limits to
converting swidden into cash crop- or rubber- producing sys-
tems, related to biophysical and cultural limitations and labor
needs, making conversion to agroforestry and tree crops more
likely pathways of intensification (Ducourtieux et al. 2006;
Cramb et al. 2009; Vongvisouk et al. 2014). The model partly
reflects these constraints using biophysical and socio-economic
variables in the suitability calculations. In any case, small-
holders will require organization, capital (seedlings, processing
capacity), support (credit, agricultural extension programs), and
infrastructure development to engage with cash crops or rubber
(Ducourtieux et al. 2006; van Vliet et al. 2012). This should be
seen as a prerequisite for the smallholder transformations to
occur as simulated in the Moratorium scenario.
Modeling the dynamics of agricultural large-scale
land acquisition
We identified two specific characteristics of LSLAs that are
relevant for their representation in land changemodels: hetero-
geneity in the scale of land change processes and the addition-
al, policy-driven demand for the (avoidance of the) effects of
LSLAs irrespective of the goods and services produced. Both
are explicitly included in our presented modeling approach.
The newly developed multi-cell allocation algorithm can rep-
resent the different spatial extents covered by particular land
systems, which is necessary when the interaction between
LSLAs and smallholder systems is addressed. The
CLUMondo approach allows the inclusion of multiple de-
mands for goods and services that drive land system changes.
However, the presented application is the first in which de-
mands for specific types of land systems are included, in ad-
dition to the still existing demand for agricultural commodities.
The multi-cell allocation algorithm gives adequate flexibility
to simulate LSLAs with varying sizes (see for example the
difference between large arable, forestry, and rubber plantations
in zoomed maps, Fig. 3). The minimum suitability threshold can
furthermore be used to simulate how much attention is given to
land suitability in including individual pixels inside LSLAs,
where a low threshold indicates an Banything goes^ attitude,
while a high threshold reflects that some attention is given to
the quality of individual pixels. Unless more is known about
underlying processes, the choice of these settings is arbitrary.
Simulation results are shaped by the amount of change and
the location of these changes, and uncertainties or inaccuracies
may appear in both (van Vliet et al. 2016). A crucial modeling
step is linking current land system locations with underlying
factors that determine the location choice. In the case of
LSLAs, relatively little is known about location choice
(Messerli et al. 2014) and our empirical analysis is based on
a relatively low number of plantations (396 projects split up in
seven land systems) covering a low number of cells per sys-
tem. The pixels involved are, due to the patch character of
LSLAs, highly autocorrelated and regression models may suf-
fer from overfitting. Nevertheless, the approach is well suited
to embed empirical evidence into the parameterization of the
model. Similarly, because the exact delineation of LSLA in
Laos is not known precisely, the values for the production of
commodities might be over- or underestimated as well.
Ongoing efforts to delineate granted, surveyed, allocated,
and ultimately developed area (Hett et al. 2015) can serve to
fine-tune such analysis.
Results indicate that, in all scenarios, the majority of the
increase in production of rubber and cash crops may be
attained by cropland expansion (to mixed extents by small-
holders and LSLAs), entailing the loss of dense forest. While
this signals that the commercial pressure on land may endan-
ger current forests, the extent of this deforestation cannot be
directly read from the land system change maps. A land sys-
tem should be interpreted as a mosaic of various land covers,
of which tree cover is one. Therefore, systems other than
dense forest also contain tree cover, and net tree cover loss is
contingent on the mosaic compositions. For example, LSLAs
are often underused and therefore LSLA systems likely con-
tain significant shares of forest cover (figures of productive
use in this study: SI-2).
In our model, we assume that the governance of LSLA, or
lack thereof, does not affect the national-level demand for
commodities. However, while cash crops and rubber can be
produced by smallholders as well as LSLA, their production
does not necessarily respond to the same market demand.
Countries and companies acquiring land are often specifically
looking to control large tracts of land or speculate on future
use. This interest in the control over land itself, rather than the
specific land-based commodities, is referred to as Bcontrol
grabbing^ (Borras and Franco 2012; Hall et al. 2015) and
may limit the assumed interchangeability between smallhold-
er and LSLA production.
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Differences and interactions between LSLA and smallhold-
er agriculture in our model are to the extent possible based on
existing literature. Some hypothetical differences and interac-
tions have not been included. Firstly, there is an ongoing de-
bate on whether the advantages of a larger-scale trump the
disadvantages. Large operations are arguably better at orga-
nizing supply to a processing plant or pioneering a crop in a
new area, while smallholders enjoy significantly lower costs
of labor management, and often acquire higher yields due to
higher-precision management for different crops (Byerlee
2014; Cramb et al. 2016). Empirical studies on this debate
indicate that throughout Southeast Asian history, there has
been a transition from large-scale to small-scale agriculture,
making the recent surge in LSLA an aberration (Bissonnette
and De Koninck 2017). Our model does not explicitly include
any (dis-)economies of scale in the production distribution of
crops (see Deininger and Byerlee (2012) and Hall (2011) for
an in-depth discussion). Second, we have not included poten-
tial synergies between LSLA and smallholders (e.g., contract
farming schemes). In such schemes, plantations may offer
capital, technique, and marketing, while smallholders provide
labor and land (Shi 2006; Cramb et al. 2016). However, how
and to what extent such synergies result in land change pro-
cesses is unclear and could be addressed in future research.
Implications for model-based land change
assessments
Since 2007, LSLA has globally become a significant land
system change trajectory (Nolte et al. 2016). The interactions
between LSLA and smallholders have been studied in local
case studies (e.g., Friis et al. 2016; Hall et al. 2017). However,
interactions at a larger scale have received far less attention
(but see Baird and Fox 2015). Smallholders around the globe
are stepping up as producers for the world markets of rubber,
biofuel crops, and other cash crops, responding to the same
global demands as LSLAs (Fox and Castella 2013;
Bissonnette and De Koninck 2015; Cramb et al. 2015). The
current study highlights the different potential roles of LSLA
and smallholders in land system change trajectories under
different scenarios. Rather than aiming at predictions of the
future, these scenarios form a boundary object for discussing
the option space for governments in dealing with high pres-
sures on their land-based commodity markets and the different
land system futures that may emerge from such choices, with-
out forming normative judgments. Whether rubber and cash
crop demand are met by smallholders, LSLAs, or a combina-
tion of both makes a strong difference in the emergent land-
scapes and the future of rural livelihoods.
Given the high impact LSLAs have on livelihoods, com-
modity markets, biodiversity, and forest cover, globally, it is
paramount to include them in model-based land change as-
sessments. Building sophisticated scenarios of LSLA
dynamics will continue to be challenging given their regime
shift-nature (Müller et al. 2014). Additionally, these systems
respond to global commodity prices, which can be hard to
predict. At the same time, LSLA-agnostic projections may
lead to naive projections of future land change dynamics that
ignore the changes in agency governing land change.
A few challenges remain. Firstly, it is widely reported that
many allotted LSLAs are not actually planted or abundant for
reasons of low commodity prices, local resistance, or specu-
lative intentions of the land investor (Liao et al. 2016).
Therefore, land system changes simulated here will in many
cases bemerely a legal change, while actual land cover change
could be limited or restricted to deforestation. More detailed,
local scale assessments could provide further insights in these
dynamics. Furthermore communities that have been expropri-
ated or otherwise affected by LSLAs may give rise to indirect
land use changes. These lower-scale impacts on livelihoods
and labor are thus a key to further understanding the impacts
of LSLAs in general (Li 2011; Oberlack et al. 2016), and on
land system changes specifically.
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